ACTION PLAN – POST-BDR KILLING SCENARIO

Contributed by Maj Zillur, Bangladesh Army

The BDR killing and the poor handling of it by the government and the Army has left the latter as the greatest casualty of the incident insofar as the morale of the organisation has been shattered making it virtually ineffective, at least for the time being. We cannot turn back the clock, and as such, a thorough analysis of what went wrong and what should be done is the only thing left before us at this time if any attempt to restore the organisation back to its previous state is to be contemplated. As this write-up is prepared in a short time, the various lists therein have not been maintained in a chronological order.
What went wrong?
Everything:
· A military situation, mishandled by the politicians under the cloak of political negotiation/settlement/handling, messing it up totally.
· Indifference, gross irresponsibility, apathy, and abuse of trust by the top brass of the military towards the sufferings of their victim officers and their families, rendering them mere spectators of the scene of the carnage.
· Utter failure of the generals to win over the political government to force the right decision.
· No feeling of guilt, no taking of responsibility, no steeping down, no resignation by a single general. They didn’t blame the government either, implying that the victims themselves were to blame for the killings and molestations.
· The generals praised the government for its actions. That implies that, a kind of hostage crisis of this sort has found a new tactics of handling, hitherto unknown and unprecedented in the history of civilisation. As the show was a total fiasco, no general criticised it, corroborating their vested interests and servility.
· The political game of arranging the escape of the killers under the protection of the army and thereafter employing the same army to hunt them down, making the officers and men homeless for months for yet another operation and hampering their professionalism by cancelling their courses and keeping them away from their core jobs.
· Complete intelligence failure. No intelligence chief took any responsibility yet, let alone resigning or stepping down. Either of these must be true: they knew the plot; they failed to know, but didn’t take responsibility for this failure, indicating their shamelessness and vested interests.
· Failure of the intelligence chiefs to warn the government about the fallout of holding back military action immediately after the commencement of the crisis, before it could be too late.
· Failure to arrange reception of the freed officers and their families at the BDR gate.
· Failure of the Army to encircle the BDR Headquarters, even with heavy presence around it.
· The role of ISPR and failure to react before mass media could damage Army’s reputation.
· Declaration of unconditional amnesty to killers by the PM, unconcerned about the fate of so many officers and their families.
· Failure to take responsibility of the dead bodies of brigadiers and colonels getting dumped at Kamrangirchar through sewerage lines. Even after identification, their names didn’t appear at the scrolls. No press briefing at AHQ.
· Use of tanks as barricades at the BDR gate to prevent spontaneous actions by a group or groups in response to the calls of their dying comrades. The generals should not blame the politicians for employment of such tactics.
· Making Army the cheapest commodity in the country, unaffected by inflation, employing Army for EVERYTHING: water supply, national ID card project, traffic control, VGF, monitoring power generation, anti-corruption drive, supervising and monitoring government officials/offices, farming, seed and fertiliser distribution monitoring, road construction, trial of political leaders, etc. and etc.
What we lost?
Many things:
· The criminals and, perhaps, many of the traces of their wrongdoings.
· Some invaluable lives. The survivors, particularly the families of the deceased, might prove to be no better than the dead.
· Trust of the junior officers on the superiors. The true nature of the damage can only be ascertained through another crisis, paying a heavier price.
· Credibility of the army as a viable force that is capable to dictate terms, and not to be dictated by corrupt political systems.
· Value of the military profession as an honourable job. A pervading sense of uncertainty and insecurity about this profession among general mass would inevitably make it the last choice for potential candidates. The actual loss, in the long run, is too enormous to ascertain. Total loss of market share in the ‘Marriage Market’.
· The force of the definition of ‘unquestionable loyalty’, the attribute central to the making of an army an effective and efficient fighting machine – an inevitable consequence of the generals’ abuse of trust placed on them and misuse of power, position, and authority.
· Some brilliant officers, who were made out of huge investment of money and effort. The vacuum can never be filled up readily. If attempted, quality must be compromised, weakening the army further, especially in the long run.
· The morale of the army – the sum total of every other thing.
What we can/should do?
Something:
· Rehabilitation of the Families.
o Settlement abroad. Many might want to settle outside to do away with the social stigma. Embassies of some friendly countries may be interested to shelter them with good jobs and education for the children.
o No long-term monetary package (it will leave scope for their harassment). Whatever is promised, those must be paid now in cash, so as to enable them to invest in the most appropriate manner.
o An army level initiative to urge all officers to donate Tk. 1,000.00 or more may be undertaken. Retired officers who are interested may also be requested to participate. Officers of sister services can also be encouraged to participate. A handsome fund can be raised through this.
o Husbands’ pensions must be paid at once, not in instalments.
o Jobs in Trust Banks as per educational qualifications.
· Reorganisation of BDR.
o Complete abolition of its entity with new name.
o Relocation of headquarters.
o New uniform.
o Five army officers per battalion – CO, 2IC, Ops Officer, Adjutant, and QM.
o No AD/DD class. Only up to JCO as company commander/2IC.
o New identification of all the battalions with mutinous battalions disbanded.
o Those involved in mutiny at the periphery, directly, indirectly, or by virtue of appointment, are laid off immediately, without any monetary benefit. Rest of the old BDRs are laid off in phases through the execution of a plan that ensures that there is no BDR element in the newly raised force after 2015.
o RSU restructured to include a section of MI/DGFI.
· Rehabilitation of the Army
o The top brass of the army involved in the decision-making process, must quit, accepting their responsibility in the fiasco.
o The DGs of DGFI and NSI must also quit, along with those people responsible for detecting the plot of the miscreants.
o The morale of the junior and mid-level officers was at the lowest ebb even before this incident and it has reached at a dangerous level following the incident. This will consequently result in a huge number of officers becoming either disinterested in service or desirous to quit prematurely. Arresting its spread will become a major challenge that would warrant more than conventional approach of our military leadership in which they usually resort to violation of officers’ legal rights either by not accepting application or, if accepted, denying their authorised pension. Our ‘intelligent’ generals failed to take note of the fact that serving officers are the best ambassadors of the organisation and if they are not interested so will be the potential candidates for this profession. The result is an obvious sharp decline in the intake of brilliant students in the army, a loss that has a far-reaching consequence perhaps the present generals will not face. Following immediate actions are to be taken:
§ Officers’ legal rights must be respected and institutional mechanisms must be developed to take measures when those are violated.
§ There should be study periods and seminars on legal rights of officers where action plans are to be recommended for implementation.
§ There should be regular/periodic address of junior officers by senior officers where the former are to be allowed to put forward their views and suggestions.
§ Officers must be allowed to lead a ‘normal’ life in which they can spend time with their families or for personal studies for self development.
§ Government holidays must be observed as holidays unless there is a serious emergency demanding immediate attention. Routine conferences, coordination, firing, and other commitments cannot be categorised as ‘serious emergency’.
§ It is a basic right of any officer to educate himself/herself on any subject of their own interests with their own cost and time, without taking any privilege from the service. It must be respected.
§ Authorised amenities and privileges, such as housing, receipt of TA/DA and other bills in time, resale-to-officers etc. must be ensured.
o The generals have used the army for non-military activities for earning ‘points’ from their civilian masters, even when not asked for. Army must not be made a cheap commodity through its involvement in non-military activities in aid of civil powers, except disaster management. The army must live by the principle – less involvement, less stigma.
o Promotion must purely be based on one’s military records only. One’s inherited affiliation with a political party must not be treated as disqualification. Political masters and DGFI must not have a hand in this affair.
o The report of the army Court of Inquiry must be made public even if it contradicts with that of the national board of inquiry.
o ISPR must be reformed with a more dynamic structure that will use media intelligence to enhance the image of the army through manipulation of mass media.
o Ceremonialism must be shunned. A thorough analysis to that effect must be made through a board so as to reduce ceremonialism and give the army a professional outlook. Senior officers like to see that their under commands losing self-control upon seeing them during visits or inspections. These must be diminished.
o Grievance handling mechanism must be geared up at all levels of hierarchy of the military. Justice and judgement must be upheld and people must be made accountable for their actions irrespective of position, rank, status, or influence. Numerous instances prove that the JAG Department does nothing to ensure that officers get justice. They are ever reluctant to go against the desire of the generals, even if those stand contrary to laws/rules. This situation must improve.
o There should be a forum where officers can express their views and suggestions for improvement of systems and processes involving life in the army. After 38 years of independence, the FC Army could not be managed to ensure that we get our dues in time, without bribing the corrupt officials, or without harassment. This must change.
o DGFI should be reformed to make it a purely inter-service intelligence organisation that would focus only on national security, and not on politics. As the leadership of this organisation is provided by the army, army’s top brass should take initiative for this reform.